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Digital Marketer | Tech Enthusiast | Football Fan | Storyteller ... Formally Dabbling in Brand Building, Content Development and Business Strategy

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

Business Development, Growth & Expansion Planning for Aspire Public Schools

Aspire Public Schools, a CMO headquartered in San Francisco, establishes and operates public charter schools in California focused on providing low-income, urban youth with a high-quality education that will prepare them for college. With a current total of 10 schools, Aspire’s objective goal was to operate 100 charter schools in the state while maintaining its credible image of consistent improvement and delivering quality service. In addition, they also aim at attaining sustainable self-sufficiency through exclusive revenue from administration fees for running their Home office’s operations.



Despite widespread recognition and ardent praise directed towards their model of imparting education, Aspire’s financial situation and academic performance at the time were far from optimal. Only two of their schools were barely meeting the minimum API score requirements and decile rankings set by the state, while astronomically high and disproportionately distributed facilities expenses across their existing schools were resulting in an average net loss of 5% of revenue per school. This was their prime concern and a specific objective was to operate facilities at an average of 12% of revenues by ensuring that new school facilities amount to a maximum of 10%. Moreover, the cost of running the home office was proving to be very expensive, with personnel expenses accounting for 70% of its budget. However, Aspire envisions increasing its staff by 50% which would characterize a further increment. Rapid expansion with a target of opening 35 schools by 2008 or less optimistically, 90 schools by 2013 coupled with philanthropic donations of 11 and 25 million dollars respectively were seen by COO Gloria Lee as a plan to attain financial stability by breaking even.     

Management at Aspire is currently poised with the lucrative yet complex prospect presented by LAUSD to establishing their nascent presence in Los Angeles by opening the first of their schools in southern California – A project that is estimated to partially capitalize on an overwhelming demand of 130,000 prospective students. While entry into LA’s school district is eventually imminent for Aspire to develop a healthy alliance and stronghold in the state, it simultaneously runs the risks associated with growing at an uncharacteristically fast rate. These include the economic burdens of opening a new regional home office, compromising on quality, sacrificing autonomy and adhering to an array of bureaucratic norms prevalent in the district along with the volatile political landscape and legislative issues that comprise of the daunting realities for schools in LA.

The second alternative that management contemplates is gradual and controlled growth of Aspire public schools within Northern California, largely influenced by historical successes in San Francisco and Oakland. With a functional home office already present in the region, increasing the number of schools under its jurisdiction seemed to be an economical and operationally efficient model. Also, owing to its stature and prowess in the region, this option would also give Aspire the flexibility to independently operate these new schools as it desired. After few years, once the region becomes saturated and when sourcing charters becomes a significant challenge, pursuing growth inwards and down the coast to find new opportunities would be the next step.

Another option is to stall growth, refine and enhance their current efforts and in few years when they are better prepared, revisit the prospect of entering Los Angeles. This would presumably entail upgrading the quality standards and performance ranking of their existing schools by focusing exclusively on the suggested five year improvement plans that were put in place, prior to considering any expansion options.

On evaluating the problems and opportunities that surround these three alternatives, I have taken the decision to pursue the first option i.e. accepting LAUSD’s offer to expand into Los Angeles, primarily because it aligns perfectly with their long term vision. However, I have recommended a slightly different approach for Aspire’s growth efforts in southern California. To begin with, the target of opening 35 schools will be met over a suggested period of 10 years by 2013 as opposed to 2008. The reason behind this is to ensure that they do not expand too fast which in retrospect, can have a detrimental impact on the quality of their services. With this comparatively conservative growth plan, Aspire will see an addition of 2 new schools per year till 2008 followed by an addition of 3 new schools per year till 2013. In this way, the percentage increase in the number of Aspire’s schools will never exceed 15% barring the first year (2004) where it will be 20%. Also, these 25 new schools will be composed of 15 elementary schools that will be opened initially, followed by 10 high schools respectively as the cost to open elementary schools is lower and Aspire has a history of successfully operating them. This will provide Aspire with time to further develop and perfect their model for high schools in the future. This model will yield a projected net profit of $1,435,275 in year 10 (2013) for all the 35 schools cumulatively while the home office will see a net profit of $266,332 as well in the same year. (Click on the spreadsheet below for forecasted calculations)


Analyzing this decision strictly from a qualitative standpoint, its potential benefits are not difficult to foresee. Firstly and in an obvious sense, it would be duly irrational for Aspire to surpass an ideal premium opportunity like this to make its segway into southern California.  With its apparent domination in the north and going to the tune of its vision to expand throughout the state, penetration into Los Angeles is all but eventually inevitable. Moreover, it will provide Aspire with the chance to leverage its unique and highly sought after teaching style to several students from the region that are in dire need of their services. This will serve to enhance their credibility and presence in the community as well. While the several issues that await Aspire as a part of this project cannot be neglected, they will also put aspire in a position Aspire to test themselves on unfamiliar terrain – A challenge that if they overcome, will set them on a perfect course to achieving their much cherished long term vision. 

In addition to this, Los Angeles is expected to spend around $8 million on new schools in the forthcoming years with about $50 million directed towards the support of facility costs for charter organizations like Aspire. LAUSD also seemed to suggest that several utility costs for Aspire-purchased land would be covered too. As identified by Lee and Shalvey, the location of this project would serve as a means of attracting a wider, ethnically diverse and greatly talented pool of prospective recruits for teacher and principal positions. Based on these possibilities, it is imperative that the decision to venture into Los Angeles will be a promising and fruitful one for Aspire.

Strategic analysis of Safeway's business model

Safeway, Inc. is a leading operator of grocery chains in North America with three prominent competitive Advantages. The company’s broad product portfolio helps it to cater to a diverse range of customers. Safeway is one of the largest food and drug retailers in North America with an extensive network of distribution, manufacturing and food processing facilities across 1,678 stores in the US and Canada. At Safeway, innovation is considered as the top priority and continues to be the cornerstone of the company’s corporate strategy. Two years ago, the company implemented the Autonomy's Intelligent Data Operating Layer software to increase operational efficiency. This continued focus on innovation and regular launch of products helps the company to align itself to the change in customers’ tastes and preferences.

However, on the other hand, Safeway is also plagued by certain weaknesses. Firstly, its failure to source and market the company’s merchandise efficiently and creatively could impair its ability to compete successfully and could adversely affect its growth opportunities. Next up is the critical issue pertaining to declined Liquidity. The company reported a decline in all the liquidity ratios. Its liquidity ratios decreased due to the increase in current liabilities. Its total current liabilities increased to $5,038.3m in the fiscal year ended 2011 from $4,314.2m in 2010. This led to a marginal decline in its liquidity indicators such as current ratio, quick ratio and cash ratio. The declining current ratio indicates that the company is in a weak position to meet its short-term obligations. The company also reported a decrease in cash and short term investments in fiscal year 2011 to the extent of 6.3% which was responsible for a recorded negative net change in cash of $49.4m. The decreasing cash reserves indicate the company’s inability to obtain additional debt to finance acquisitions, capture business opportunities and meet capital expenditure or other capital requirements in the future. In addition to this, Safeway has also recorded an increasing number of product recalls. Such recalls can hamper Safeway’s brand image and have a significant impact on its product sales. In addition, they not only affect the company's current revenues, but could also affect its long-term performance by reducing customer confidence. Another vital concern focusses on revenue concentration: Safeway’s financial performance is highly dependent on the US and Canadian operations, which comprised about 84.6% and 15.4%, respectively, of its total revenue for fiscal year 2011. The US economy is recovering very slowly and any such macro-economic factors slowing its revenue generation or decline in its business and financial performance from the US segment could have an adverse effect over its operating cash flows.

That being said, Safeway has a number of opportunities that they can capitalize upon characterized by a wide range of Private label brands, growing demand for organic products, an increase in Online Sales and an array of strategic agreements and partnerships with the USDA and the CNPP.



On the flip side however, Safeway is also faced by several key risks such as fierce competitive pressures from traditional grocery retailers, non-traditional competitors such as super-centers and club stores, as well as from specialty supermarkets, drug stores, dollar stores, convenience stores and restaurants. Unfavorable alterations in Government Regulations as well as changes in Labor Laws make for an even more challenging environment.


Discount Rate Analysis: During the fiscal year ended December 2011, Safeway recorded an increase in revenues of 6.29% over 2010.  The operating profit of the company was USD 1,134.60 million during the fiscal year 2011 - A decrease of 2.14% from 2010 while the net profit of the company was USD 516.70 million during the fiscal year 2011, a decrease of 12.39% from 2010. Based on these financial indicators, I would recommend a conservative discount rate of 15% taking into consideration the volatility of Safeway’s business environment, their low liquidity and the growing prospects of potential threats from giant retailers like Walmart.  All these factors create a predicament of ambiguity for Safeway’s future.